ADDENDUM TO 

RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS 

AIR FORCE BOARD FOR CORRECTION OF MILITARY RECORDS 

 

IN THE MATTER OF: DOCKET NUMBER: BC-1986-01455; 

 BC-1996-00399 

 

 COUNSEL: 

 

 HEARING DESIRED: NO 

 

_________________________________________________________________ 

 

APPLICANT REQUESTS THAT: 

 

1. His records be corrected to reflect he was retired for 
physical disability for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) 
and/or major depression, rather than discharged for a personality 
disorder. 

 

2. In the alternative, his 1984 discharge should be set aside 
and he be constructively reinstated to active duty for the 
remaining balance of his 6-year term of enlistment, granting 
regular retirement with back pay. 

 

_________________________________________________________________ 

 

STATEMENTS OF FACTS: 

 

On 27 Mar 85, by virtue of a DD Form 149 (AFBCMR Docket Number 
BC-1986-01455), the applicant requested his records be corrected 
to reflect his administrative discharge for personality disorder 
be set aside; he be reinstated to active duty in the grade of 
senior master sergeant (E-8) and provided a six-year controlled 
tour at Charleston AFB, SC; 41.5 days of leave be restored to his 
leave balance; his airman performance report (APR) closing 
6 Mar 84 be removed from his records; and he be reimbursed all 
legal fees and expenses. The applicant contended there was an 
insufficient basis for his administrative discharge as he did not 
have a personality or adjustment disorder. However, finding no 
evidence of an error or injustice in the discharge proceedings or 
in his military record, the Board denied his requests in full on 
25 Jul 86. For an accounting of the facts and circumstances 
surrounding the applicant’s request, and the rationale of the 
earlier decision by the Board, see the Record of Proceedings at 
Exhibit G. 

 

By virtue of an 18 Jan 87 letter, with attachments, the applicant 
requested reconsideration of his case. He contended the Air 
Force psychological testing which showed there was “no 
significant psychopathology noted,” combined with the fact that 
his civilian licensed clinical psychologist made no mention of a 
personality disorder in his evaluation were proof that he did not 
suffer from a personality or adjustment disorder at the time of 


his separation, thus, rendering his discharge inappropriate. 
However, on 6 Jul 87, the Board considered and denied his request 
for reconsideration, indicating the new evidence provided by the 
applicant was insufficient to cause the Board to reverse its 
previous determination. For an accounting of the facts and 
circumstances surrounding the applicant’s request, and the 
rationale of the earlier decision by the Board, see the Record of 
Proceedings at Exhibit H. 

 

On 12 Oct 95, by virtue of a DD Form 149, with attachments, the 
applicant requested that his narrative reason for separation, as 
reflected on his DD Form 214, Certificate of Release or Discharge 
from Active Duty, be changed to reflect that he was retired for 
reasons of physical disability rather than for a personality 
disorder (AFBCMR Docket Number BC-1996-00399). The applicant 
contended the Department of Veterans Affairs (DVA) had determined 
his discharge should have been medical in nature and granted him 
service connection for his Dysthymia. On 23 Jan 97, the Board 
considered and denied his request, noting the applicant underwent 
a mental health examination prior to his separation and there was 
no indication of any medical problems or restrictions which would 
warrant medical disability; the reason for the discharge was 
fully documented in the records and it was established that no 
error or injustice occurred. For an accounting of the facts and 
circumstances surrounding the applicant’s request, and the 
rationale of the earlier decision by the Board, see the Record of 
Proceedings at Exhibit I. 

 

By virtue of DD Form 149, Application for Correction of Military 
Record, dated 15 Feb 2011, with attachments, the applicant again 
requests reconsideration of his request and, through Counsel, 
makes the following contentions: 

 

1. A 2007 General Accountability Office (GAO) Report warrants 
new due process in the applicant’s case. It is the equitable 
practice of all Discharge Review Boards (DRBs) and Boards for 
Correction on Military Records (BCMRs) to consider retroactive 
application of favorable due process safeguards. 

 

2. During the applicant’s two tours in Vietnam he was exposed to 
enemy artillery and rocket attacks, the death of buddies, and a 
close friend. The DVA determined the applicant’s delayed onset 
PTSD and major depression were service-connected and rated at 
50 percent. 

 

3. With respect to the applicant’s discharge, the personality 
disorder diagnosis did not examine the co-morbidity of PTSD and 
related mental illness of depression. This should have been 
considered since his prior 13 years of service did not support a 
persistent history of personality disorder type behavior. 

 


4. He provides an Army Board for Correction of Military Records 
(ABCMR) case where an experienced combat veteran was discharged 
for personality disorder. However, the ABCMR determined the 
member was misdiagnosed and later discredited the personality 
disorder diagnosis and correctly recognized the member’s 
condition as delayed onset of combat-related PTSD. 

 

5. Dr. A provides a separate opinion in the applicant’s case, 
concluding the applicant does not have a personality disorder, 
and never had a personality disorder. Dr. A. states that PTSD 
presents initially with symptoms of anxiety and or depression and 
the probable onset of the applicant’s PTSD was in 1983. The 
applicant’s symptoms and conflicts with others first appeared in 
1983 and were not the result of adjustment disorder but rather 
the onset of a psychiatric illness which became increasingly 
severe over time. 

 

6. The Air Force diagnosed the applicant with personality traits 
disturbance under DSM-II in 1984 and not the long-term pattern 
disturbance. The Air Force never explored co-morbidity in the 
case as the DVA has, such as major depression and PTSD, from 
combat trauma to reconcile the contradictions in the applicant’s 
long exemplary career. DoD Directive 1332.14, states that for 
members facing discharge due to personality disorder who served 
in a combat zone the diagnosis must address PTSD or other mental 
illness co-morbidity. 

 

In support of his request, the applicant, through his counsel, 
submits an expanded statement, a newspaper article describing 
improvements made for disability ratings, several DVA Rating 
Decisions, extracts from his medical records, GAO Report GAO-10-
1013T, Defense Health Care, Status of Efforts to Address Lack of 
Compliance with Personality Disorder Separation Requirements, GAO 
Report GAO-09-31, Defense Health Care, Additional Efforts needed 
to Ensure Compliance with Personality Disorder Separation 
Requirements, an article entitled Personality Disorders – Brief 
Historical Review, Department of the Army Record of Proceedings, 
Medical Report from Dr. A, articles on Adjustment Disorder and 
Personality Disorders, extracts from the applicant’s military 
personnel records and other documents related to his request. 

 

The applicant's complete submission, with attachments, is at 
Exhibit J. 

 

_________________________________________________________________ 

 

AIR FORCE EVALUATION: 

 

The AFBCMR Medical Consultant recommends denial, indicating the 
applicant has not met the burden of proof of a material error or 
injustice. First, it is important to note that the delayed 
establishment of service connection for a new clinical diagnosis 
by the DVA does not automatically infer that it was an unfitting 
condition at the time of release from military service. The 


Military Disability Evaluation System, established to maintain a 
fit and vital fighting force, can by law, under Title 10, United 
States Code (USC), only offer compensation for those service 
incurred diseases or injuries which specifically rendered a 
member unfit for continued active service and were the cause for 
career termination; and then only for the degree of impairment 
present at the time of separation and not based on future 
occurrences. For an individual to be considered unfit for 
continued military service there must be a medical condition that 
prevents or interferes with the performance of duties 
commensurate with office, grade, rank, and rating; or which may 
preclude worldwide qualification for military duties. 
Additionally, the condition could be disqualifying under AFR 35-4 
(forerunner of today's AFI 48-123, Medical Examination and 
Standards). However, in the applicant’s case, he was 
administratively discharged under provisions of AFR 39-10 
(forerunner of today's AFI 36-3208, Administrative Separation of 
Airmen) for a mental disorder that was considered unseating for 
military service and did not render him eligible for processing 
as a medical discharge. Department of Defense Instruction 
1332.38 lists Conditions and Circumstances Not Constituting a Disability and these conditions include Personality Disorders and Adjustment Disorders. The mere fact that the nomenclature 
assigned to the applicant's mental status has changed over 
several decades, as disclosed at his July 2002 DVA Compensation & 
Pension examination, does not invalidate the accuracy of the 
diagnosis that resulted in his separation; a time during which 
the applicant also desired to return to duty, as defended in his 
14 Apr 86 statements associated with his initial request to be 
reinstated to active duty. Simply put, his PTSD was neither 
diagnosable nor showed evidence of being an unfitting condition 
at the time of the applicant's separation; and thus should be not 
now be determined as the alternative cause for his separation. 
Although, over time, the applicant has reported signs and 
symptoms attributed to his service in Vietnam and has achieved a 
delayed diagnosis of PTSD, it is not proof that it was either 
diagnosable or unfitting at the time of his release from military 
service. Under Title 38, USC, the DVA is authorized to offer 
compensation for any medical condition determined service 
incurred, without regard to [and independent of] its demonstrated 
or proven impact upon a service member's retainability, fitness 
to serve, narrative reason for separation, or the intervening 
period since the date of separation. With this in mind, the DVA 
is authorized to award compensation ratings for conditions that 
were not unfitting during military service at the time of 
separation, such as the case with the applicant’s PTSD. This is


 

The complete AFBCMR Medical Consultant’s evaluation is at 
Exhibit G. 

 

_________________________________________________________________ 

 

APPLICANT’S REVIEW OF AIR FORCE EVALUATION: 

 

Counsel states the advisory opinion recommends denial of relief 
arguing that only the nomenclature assigned to the applicant’s 
mental status has changed over the decades while the accuracy of 
the original diagnosis remains valid. However, this is merely a 
play on words and the original diagnosis is framed in a different 
way. The opinion never honestly addresses the question as to 
what medical condition the applicant was suffering. After 
avoiding Dr. A’s analysis, the advisory opinion trots out the 
standard reply that it’s not the DAV’s job to determine military 
unfitness, but post-service civilian impairment. However, the 
medical opinions of DVA psychologists and psychiatrists are 
relevant on a limited forensic issue, that upon their review of 
military medical records from 1983 to 1984, the DVA found 
symptoms demonstrating not a personality disorder, but a 
psychiatric disability in service. 

 

Although Dr. A found that adjustment disorder may have been 
appropriate in Nov 1983, by early 1984 (before discharge) the 
applicant was mentally ill with a significant psychiatric 
disorder. By 2001, the DVA chronicled a long history of PTSD 
with dysthymia and recurrent episodes of major depression 
disorder (MDD). Dr. A concludes the first MDD episode occurred 
in 1983 to 1984 while the applicant served on active duty. At a 
minimum, this establishes the applicant should have been assigned 
to the Temporary Disability Retirement List (TDRL) in 1984 for 
five years as unresolved PTSD manifested in the applicant. 
Moreover, in 1995 and 2001 the DVA found the applicant’s military 
medical records demonstrated some form of a psychiatric 
disability. However, the advisory opinion is silent with respect 
to Dr. A’s learned analysis and these DVA determinations. It 
simply says the unsuitable label assigned is controlling, as if 
the tail must wag the dog. 

 

The advisory opinion does not dispute the applicant served in 
Vietnam and was repeatedly exposed to PTSD qualifying stressors. 
Nor does it dispute that later as a Combat Arms Maintenance 
Training Drill Master, the applicant’s job was to maintain and 
fire weapons and recreate combat conditions to train security 
forces against air base attacks. There is no dispute the 
surrounding circumstances of the psychological examination for 
firearms access in 1983, and the altercation at a firing range 
over safety, and the applicant’s perceived unresolved anger to 


the safety and welfare of his isolated stateside family and 
spouse, who was a Vietnamese refugee. 

 

During this time, the applicant was experiencing the early 
progression of PTSD manifested by intense but generalized 
psychological distress, anxiety and depression over life events, 
together with physiological bodily reactions, suicidal and 
homicidal intent, not full blown recurrent flashbacks and 
nightmares, and dissociation and psychoses. Instead, the 
advisory opinion demands a simplistic one-size-fits-all PTSD. 
This ignores the fact that PTSD is frequently a progressive 
disease, as in this case. 

 

The advisory opinion admits the applicant experienced a delayed 
onset of PTSD, but it argues this is not proof that it was either 
diagnosable or unfitting at the time. This brings the opinion 
full circle back to the underlying medical mistake the 
applicant’s condition was diagnosable with a personality disorder 
and separated for that reason. 

 

However, when it comes to PTSD, an initial diagnosis of anxiety 
and or depression is frequently made; only after passage of time 
is the PTSD diagnosis evident. The probable onset of the 
applicant’s PTSD was in 1983, and the initial symptoms were the 
beginning of major depression and PTSD. His symptoms were 
significant, but not sufficiently clear to diagnose PTSD. The 
major depression rendered the applicant unfit for continued 
military service and would likely qualify for a disability rating 
of 25-50 percent. 

 

Furthermore, PTSD was not introduced until 1980 and remained 
controversial, with evolving acceptance and criteria. 
Consideration of this unique situation falls within the broader 
role of the AFBCMR to measure the injustice of a belated Vietnam-
era PTSD diagnosis after growing institutional understanding and 
acceptance. According to Dr. A, delayed onset PTSD is often a 
progressive disease, but frequently it is initially diagnosed as 
anxiety and or depression and is only evident as PTSD after the 
passage of time. This is supported by the fact that PTSD is not 
limited to the common conscious reliving of the original 
traumatic event, but can include unconscious responses such as 
intense psychological distress or physiological reactivity. 

 

The six year period from 1984 to 1991, the applicant suffered 
from major depression and his inability to maintain steady 
employment. The applicant’s inability to maintain steady 
employment in addition to his depressive symptoms supported the 
finding of the DVA rating decision in Aug 1995. The Board of 
Veterans Appeals (BOVA) determined from the findings of acute 
situational depression and military job impairment, the applicant 
demonstrated some form of psychiatric disorder while he was in 
the service. 

 


Counsel cites the 2009 Sabo v. United States case, a class-action 
suit settled by DOD allowing former members medically discharged 
from Dec 2002 to 2008 for PTSD, but awarded less than a 50 
percent rating as applicable in the applicant’s case. The suit 
alerted DOD to past military agency error in rating PTSD. As a 
result, in 2009, DOD began enforcing the overlooked federal 
regulation to award 50 percent for PTSD prior to discharge. Sabo 
v. United States is retroactive to Dec 2002, so the applicant’s 
discharge date makes him ineligible as a class member of the 
settlement for PTSD ratings. Although not strictly eligible as a 
claimant for this court-sanctioned review, the underlying 
equitable issue remains before the AFBCMR. 

 

The applicant is also similarly situated to an applicant to the 
ABCMR, a decorated Vietnam veteran, who subsequently became a 
drill instructor and was ultimately misdiagnosed with a 
personality disorder. The BCMR corrected his record to show that 
he suffered a delayed onset of PTSD. 

 

Lastly, counsel states the applicant was an elite noncommissioned 
officer who served honorably and his records should be corrected 
to reflect the proper medical disability diagnosis with 
retirement. 

 

The counsel’s complete response is at Exhibit I. 

 

_________________________________________________________________ 

 

THE BOARD CONCLUDES THAT: 

 

After reviewing this application and the evidence provided in 
support of his appeal, we remain unpersuaded the applicant’s 
discharge should be changed to reflect that he was retired due to 
physical disability. After a thorough review of the 
documentation submitted in support of his most recent appeal, to 
include his response to the advisory opinion rendered in this 
case, we do not believe he has overcome the rationale expressed 
in our previous decision. In making such determination, we find 
the medical findings rendered at the time of final disposition, 
carry the most weight, as they were rendered by individuals 
closest to the situation at the time, with firsthand knowledge. 
In the applicant’s case, the evidence of record reveals he 
experienced psychological stressors when faced with separation 
from his foreign born wife while on assignment. During this 
separation and as a result of several acts of misconduct, and 
concerns for his access to military firearms, the applicant was 
referred for mental health evaluation and was subsequently 
diagnosed with an adjustment disorder. We note that “Personality 
Disorder” was used to characterize all unsuiting mental health 
disorders on the DD Form 214 at the time of the applicant’s 
discharge, even in cases such as his when the diagnosis was 
adjustment disorder, not personality disorder. 

 


While we note the evidence of record reveals that subsequent to 
his discharge the applicant reported signs and symptoms that he 
attributed to his service in Vietnam and he has achieved a 
diagnosis of PTSD by the Department of Veteran Affairs, it is not 
proof that he manifested the clinical signs and symptoms the 
disorder nor was it unfitting at the time of his discharge from 
military service. Additionally, we note that although the Air 
Force is required to rate disabilities in accordance with the DVA 
Schedule for Rating Disabilities, the DVA operates under a 
totally separate system with a different statutory basis. In 
this respect, we note the DVA rates for any and all service-
connected conditions, to the degree they interfere with future 
employability, without regard to is proven or demonstrated impact 
upon a service member’s retainability, fitness to serve or 
narrative reason for release from military service; whereas,under 
Title 10 U.S.C, the Air Force rates a condition only when it has 
been determined unfitting for further mililitary service; and 
then only to the degree present at the time of release from 
military service. We also note the comments and supporting 
statement by the applicant’s civilian physician indicating his 
belief the applicant’s current condition is attributable to his 
service in Vietnam. However, this statement, rendered many years 
after the fact, combined with the documentary evidence before us, 
is not sufficient for us to conclude that his post-traumatic 
stress disorder (PTSD) contributed to his misconduct or the 
diagnosis that precipitated his administrative discharge or that 
it serves to substantiate the applicant should be retired for 
physical disability. As such, we find action and disposition in 
the applicant’s case to be in compliance with the Air Force 
regulations in effect at the time of his discharge. While we 
note Counsel’s argument that a recent GAO Report recommends 
military members facing discharge for personality disorder be 
evaluated for post-traumatic stress disorder and the findings 
reviewed by the Surgeon General, we find no relevancy to his 
argument since the applicant was discharged over 25 year ago. 
Additionally, the GAO study along with the recommendation was 
conducted based on studies of soldiers who served in Afghanistan 
and Iraq and the findings along with the recommendations are not 
applied retroactively to every member who faced combat service. 
Moreover, we are unable to link the applicant’s case, or 
relevancy thereof, to the 2009 Sabo v. United States case. As 
Counsel points out, the noted case is relevant to those who were 
discharged for physical disability because of their unfitting 
PTSD diagnosis. However, in view of the fact we have determined 
the applicant’s discharge for his unsuiting condition was 
appropriate to the circumstances, the noted case has no 
applicability to the applicant’s situation. Finally, Counsel 
contends the applicant is similarly situated to a former Army 
Soldier who successfully appealed for similar relief from the 
Army Board for Correction of Military Records (ABCMR). However, 
while the ABCMR found clear evidence of a diagnosis of combat 
fatigue associated with the Soldier’s combat service in Vietnam, 
followed by several hospitalizations for psychiatric reasons, as 
well as a concerted effort by the Army in subsequent years to 


find the right assignment and classification for the Soldier for 
the changes being exhibited in his personality, the applicant has 
shown no such causal relationship between his service in Vietnam 
in 1970 and his adjustment disorder diagnosis some 13 years 
later. In fact, contrary to the circumstances in the noted case, 
Counsel has argued that the applicant’s service over the course 
of the years between his service in Vietnam and his adjustment 
disorder diagnosis was impeccable and has presented no evidence 
to indicate there were similar circumstances at play in the 
applicant’s case. We note the statement provided by Dr. A. 
indicating that in his opinion the onset of the applicant’s PTSD 
was in 1983 and was exacerbated over several years. However, the 
Air Force physicians who diagnosed the applicant with having a 
personality disorder were fully qualified professionals and 
determined upon examination the applicant in fact did suffer from 
adjustment disorder. In view of these facts and in the absence 
of evidence to the contrary, we are not inclined to substitute 
our judgment for that of responsible officials some twenty-eight 
(28) years after the event in question, especially since the 
evidence provided does not support that they were not qualified 
and failed to properly discharge their duties and properly 
handled the applicant’s case. Counsel’s many arguments are duly 
noted; however, we do not find these arguments and the 
documentation presented sufficient to convince us that competent 
authority should have found the applicant unfit for military 
service for PTSD at the time of his discharge. Therefore, we 
find no basis to recommend granting the relief sought in this 
application. 

 

_________________________________________________________________ 

 

THE BOARD DETERMINES THAT: 

 

The applicant be notified the additional evidence presented did 
not demonstrate the existence of material error or injustice; the 
application was denied without a personal appearance; and the 
application will only be reconsidered upon the submission of 
newly discovered relevant evidence not considered with this 
application. 

 

_________________________________________________________________ 

 

The following members of the Board considered AFBCMR Docket 
Numbers BC-1986-01455 and BC-1996-00399 in Executive Session on 
6 Aug 12, under the provisions of AFI 36-2603: 

 

 , Panel Chair 

 , Member 

 , Member 

 


The following documentary evidence pertaining to AFBCMR Docket 
Numbers BC-1986-01455 and BC-1996-00399 was considered: 

 

 Exhibit G. Record of Proceedings (ROP) (BC-1986-01455), 

 undated. 

 Exhibit H. Addendum to ROP (BC-1986-01455), dated 18 Aug 87. 

 Exhibit I. ROP (BC-1996-00399), dated 3 Apr 97, w/atchs. 

 Exhibit J. DD Form 149, dated 15 Feb 11, w/atchs. 

 Exhibit K. Letter, AFBCMR Medical Consultant, 

 dated 14 Nov 11. 

 Exhibit L. Letter, SAF/MRBR, dated 18 Nov 11. 

 Exhibit M. Letter, Counsel, dated 10 Dec 11, w/atchs. 

 

 

 

 

 

 Panel Chair